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The idea of globalization is not a modern invention, even though in the Spanish colonial 
period examined in the following the world was viewed differently from today (see for 
instance Knight 2001).1 It was one of the goals of the Spanish Crown to export the Spanish 
social, religious and administrative system to the New World, while at the same time 
attempting to extract wealth from the continent. These goals were considered perfectly 
ordinary then though they do seem contradictory today. “Paternalism and interest in 
converting the indigenous population were not incompatible with economic exploitation and 
imperial defense“, as William Taylor has summed up the Spanish attitudes (Taylor 1979:17). 
Patricia Seed concurs: “Pursuing gold and God at the same time appeared entirely 
reasonable.“ (Seed 2001:69, Lynch 1969:170) Quite obviously, none of these and other aims 
could be met successfully governing purely from a distance, from Spain. Therefore, 
representatives were needed in the New World.2  
It was the responsibility of these men to implement the policies of the Crown especially 
with regards to the indigenous populations of the Americas. And the outcome to a significant 
extent depended on the way they did their job, the manner in which they pursued 
globalization in the sense of hispanicization. In this way, they were indeed meant to do 
something similar to what development experts are doing nowadays and for what the latter 
are called colonizers every now and then by the local population. 3 
But were they really “development experts”, in the strict sense of the term? Were they 
trying to further development in the Americas? And were they experts? Did they face similar 
                     
1
 “It is well known that Spaniards came to America with very specific and rigid ideas on what constituted 
civilisation. In essence, they adhered strictly to the etymological origins of the word, FLYLV meant, in Latin, 
city.” (Patch 1993:48) 
2
 In the following, the lower ranks of colonial administrators in Spanish America will be examined - with the 
exception of the example of Peruvian viceroy Toledo – before and after the Bourbon reforms. Walter K. H. 
Hoffmann examines colonial experts as well, also following the question if and how they were predecessors 
of today’s development experts. However, Hoffmann concentrates more on the training of these people (see 
Hoffmann 1980). For a discussion of the methodological framework and common problems of such 
undertakings, see Eckert (1997:35-60). The criticism included about the lack of research concerning 
administrators applies to colonial Latin America as well. 
3
 Today development experts play a major role in disseminating knowledge and in translating development 
strategies and concepts into action. It is hypothesised that the development consultancy business will expand 
and that the demand for international and for local experts will expand further. The invention and 
dissemination of development concepts and strategies seems to be comparable with processes in colonial 
times. Development experts and their organisations accept these concepts and strategies, combine them with 
past experience ("lessons learned") and translate them into advisory services for their partners in the 
developing world. The translation of concepts and strategies takes place within the global discourse of 
epistemic communities of experts, but also within the social and cultural context of developing countries. 
Those processes have been optimised through an appropriate knowledge management. It is evident to us that 
the study of the globalisation of knowledge, strategies and concepts should start with the colonial period. 
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problems and challenges as today’s experts are forced to tackle? Have matters and procedures 
been improved since the days of these proto-development experts? These are the main 
questions the article will discuss by examining the available literature on the subject - but in a 
new light and by drawing on new research on modern development experts. 
 
Before a real colonial system was set up and before colonial officials were sent to the New 
World or while there were only very few, it were the FRQTXLVWDGRUHV to take over their tasks. 
They were the first Spaniards present. Instead of pay they received land grants and 
HQFRPLHQGDV, contingents of Indians supposed to serve them as a temporary labor force and to 
pay tribute.4 These FRQTXLVWDGRUHV and also HQFRPHQGHURV were supposed to educate “their” 
Indians in the Catholic faith in return for their labor. This education was a first step to the 
ultimate object, their hispanicization.5 The Spaniards considered themselves, their culture, 
and their way of life to be infinitely superior to that of the “savages” they encountered in what 
is today called Latin America.6 So there were amateurs with ulterior motives at work, pushing 
hispanicization as an earlier form of globalization, before the “real” experts, the 
administrators were present in larger numbers in the New World.7 And even after the latter 
had finally arrived it was deemed that they needed help with their task.8 Therefore, the 
assignment of introducing Indian communities to the Spanish way of life was frequently 
delegated to missionaries, who were exclusively dedicated to that task. But how successful 
were the ones who were really supposed to be in charge of the tasks outlined above, the 
Crown’s officials? How did they work? How did the Indians respond to the new 
introductions, to the transformation of their accustomed world into a New World? How did 
officials and Indians interact? What elements were crucial for a colonial official to perform 
                     
4
 Reportedly, the underlying assumption to the HQFRPLHQGD was that Indians could only be of service through 
their labour (see Service 1954:44). For a brief but thorough general discussion of HQFRPLHQGD see Gibson 
(1987:366-368). 
Tribute was a head tax levied on male Indians of a certain age or heads of families. Yet in practice, this tax was a 
thing that concerned the entire community. It had its origins in a Spanish tradition, the payment of SHFKR, 
but many Indians had also paid tribute pre-conquest (see Gibson 1987:379). 
5
 In the context of postcolonial and development studies this can be viewed as an euro-centric perspective on 
modernization. The critical debate on global knowledge management is currently questioning again to what 
extent local knowledge systems and local cultures are recognized and integrated, and multiple modernities 
possible. For a summary on this discussion, see Evers, Kaiser and Müller (2003). 
6
 This paper is dedicated to the study of Spanish America only, without attempting to include the Portuguese 
realm. 
7
 The lower ranks of officials received mostly standardised instructions (see Pietschmann 1980b:130). 
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his task well, to be an expert? Were the problems civil servants encountered back then 
different from the ones development experts face nowadays? 
 These are questions, which have rarely been asked in the past.9 Thus there are no easy 
answers, especially not since many of the sources which could have shed light on the matter 
have often been lost. But these questions also take us back to Spain’s first ventures into in the 
New World. While certain parts of Spain’s colonial enterprise have been researched 
thoroughly and in much detail, the daily interactions between colonial officials and Indians 
have received very little attention so far. These interactions have been somewhat more in the 
focus of studies on the missions. The issue as such, however, has been a prime focus of 
globalization studies. Therefore, while the Spanish colonial system in general has been 
explored fairly deeply, quite often one gets the impression that Spanish colonial policy took 
place in an empty space. 
 
When Christopher Columbus chanced upon the American continent and mistook it for 
India, this “first” encounter brought about such deep and far reaching consequences that the 
place was indeed so much changed that it was turned into a new world, even for its traditional 
inhabitants. After this “discovery”, Spain was confronted with the organization and the 
administration of its New World possessions and found itself with a host of problems to 
solve. The main problem was how to deal with the indigenous population of the newly found 
continent. This was a matter of much discussion and many disputes and not only in the early 
phase of the Spanish presence in what today is called Latin America.10 Finally, the Spanish 
Crown adopted a credo, the so-called doctrine of discovery, which will be briefly sketched in 
the following.11 In many ways, even the successor states followed these colonial attitudes and 
practices. 
The Spaniards believed that the Europeans had pre-eminent rights to the “pristine” 
                                                                
8
 The missions are not a topic of this paper. They are investigated in another research project of the Bielefeld 
Institute for Global Society Studies directed by Hartmann Tyrell on “Christian world missions in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. Protestant missionary societies as global organisation from 1790 – 1960”. 
9
 For a more general criticism of a lack of studies of Native Americans in Spanish America, see Gibson 
(1987:361-363). 
10
 Among the most outspoken critics of the treatment of the Indians in Spanish America was Bartolomé de las 
Casas. 
11
 For a very detailed discussion of the doctrine of discovery and claims to territory in Colonial America, see 
Green (1989). For more details on sovereignty, especially in US law and concerning Native Americans, see 
Schultz, Haynie, McCulloch, Aoki (2000:691-692). 
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lands of the New World.12 In addition, they thought themselves obligated to bring the infidels 
over to Christianity, getting their land and labor force in return. Wars could be waged against 
the native inhabitants as long as they were deemed “just” by the Europeans.13 The Spanish 
considered the lands found as already theirs, even prior to occupation. Also, a document, the 
UHTXLULPLHQWR, informing the natives about this and other matters, was read to them upon 
contact, asking them to submit, justifying military means should this not be the case (Pagden 
1995:91). Otherwise, the Spaniards were occupied with titles to labor, the HQFRPLHQGDVmore 
than with land titles. In this system, the master, the HQFRPHQGHUR, was entitled to Indian labor 
in exchange for a small wage, the duty to protect them, and instruction in the Christian 
doctrine. 
Consequently, the Spaniards saw no need to regulate their affairs with the indigenous 
peoples through treaties.14 They considered their obligations towards them mostly met by 
educating them in the Christian faith. The Spanish FRQTXLVWDGRUHV, arriving in the early 
sixteenth century, with a view to find gold and silver saw the locals as more than just a 
nuisance to be subjugated.15 After some discussion if the Indians were human at all or maybe 
members of the lost tribes of Israel, the Spaniards quickly found out the possibilities of 
putting the natives to use.16 Initially, they were enslaved but the Spanish Crown put an end to 
that practice in 1500 (see Pieper and Luetjens 1994:578). From then on, even the former 
slaves were considered to be subjects of the Crown, with the same rights and duties as 
mainland Spaniards – at least in theory. Yet while the Indians were considered humans, they 
were also viewed as child-like, “fit only to be used for pleasure or profit.“ (Turner 1968:25, 
Borah 1983:28-30) They were therefore time and again subject to colonial paternalistic laws – 
                     
12
 For a detailed discussion of the British and Spanish ideologies see Pagden (1995: chap. 2 and 3). 
13
 The term “just war”, which conferred upon the aggressor a right to wage war, was governed by a set of rules. 
The Romans originally used the concept for defensive wars only. According to Spanish attitudes, a Christian 
prince could also go to war to defend the Christian FLYLWDV. 
14
 This was what the British and later on the Americans did. On colonial attitudes, rights to land acquisition, the 
papal bulls on lawful conduct towards the Indians, and the implications these factors had on the latter, see 
Churchill (1993:35-36). 
Uninhabited lands were considered to be the property of the Crown. Title to inhabited lands belonged inherently 
to the indigenous peoples living on it but, with discovery, the Crown had exclusive rights to extinguish this 
title. 
15
 Fernando Cortés arrived in 1519 in the southern part of what today is called Mexico, on the island of 
Cozumel. The British came for trade and agriculture, though only when they did not find gold and silver (see 
Pagden 1995:68-69). 
16
 In 1537 the papal bull “Sublimis Deus” had declared the Indians to be human beings and capable of reason. 
Woodrow Borah argues that, had the natives seriously been regarded as animals, the Spaniards involved in 
sexual relations with them would have been severely punished (see Borah 1983:27). For a discussion of the 
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and to mistreatment.17 This seems somewhat contradictory, but, as Woodrow Borah points 
out, it is hard to find “clear lines in royal policy because there were few explicit formulations 
of it.“ (Borah 1983:31) 
The FRQTXLVWDGRUHV, who were at least in theory the first Spanish civil servants, saw 
cheap labor much needed to extract the riches and to feed the people.18 And they and their 
successors did exploit this cheap labor force intensely in the years to come. “At first, 
especially in mining and agriculture, Indians supplied the labor, generated some of the capital, 
and provided much of the necessary technology and social organization for the production of 
goods.” (Cockcroft 1990:9)19 Often, the FRQTXLVWDGRUHV managed to play the Indians against 
each other, thus causing the comparatively rapid fall of what was once known as “high 
cultures”, like the Aztec/Mexica, Inca and Maya empires (Gibson 1987:385). Let it suffice 
here to say that their advanced organization worked against them (see Pagden 1995:65). Once 
subjugated, they were fairly easy to govern, the Spaniards drawing and building on pre-
Conquest institutions.20 For instance, collection of tribute was conducted via traditional 
authorities, FDFLTXHVor FXUDFDV, who also profited from the arrangement (Gibson 1964:1997 
and 211).21 The general procedure was for the FDFLTXH to collect the tribute, which was then 
handed to the administrator, and eventually went into the &DMD5HDO (see O’Phelan Godoy 
1985:48). “To a significant degree, ... Indians – through their gifts, labor, and forced tribute – 
paid for their own conquest.” (Cockcroft 1990:24, Pietschmann 1980a:77) This was one 
reason why there were not serious attempts to destroy all parts of native government (Gibson 
1966:149).22 But it quite obviously also meant that the people officially in charge of tribute 
collection and other matters, the colonial officials, were removed from the people they were 
                                                                
intellectual problems connected with the conquest, see Borah (1983) and also Hanke (1935: especially 3-
25). 
17
 And these paternalistic attitudes were and are slow to change. For instance, John Lynch explains how, after the 
introduction of the intendant system, these newly appointed officials still kept discussing the nature of 
Indians with the old terms and concepts (see Lynch 1969:1999). 
18
 Simpson (1934) shares our opinion on the conquistadores being the first officials. 
19
 Cockcroft (1990:9). Indian slavery existed, though only for a short period. It was abolished by the Crown in 
1500 (see Pietschmann 1980b:176). 
20
 To explore this in greater detail would take too long to include and is not the objective of this work. A fair 
number of monographs have already been written on these societies, also including the Conquest, its 
aftermath and effects. See for example the previously quoted books by Wolf (1982), Gibson (1987, 1964), 
and Pagden (1995). 
21
 The term FDFLTXH, an Arawak word brought by the Spaniards from the West Indies, took the place of other 
terms. Sometimes the term replaced older ones and was used for leaders elected under new rules (see Gibson 
1987:370).Karen Spalding also points to the attempts of FDFLTXHV to obtain higher offices (see Spalding 
1968:207). James Lockhardt points out how limited these possibilities were with the case of don Martín (see 
Lockhardt 1968:213-215). 
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supposed to govern and guide, to hispanicize. 
The native peoples causing much more serious and enduring problems to the 
FRQTXLVWDGRUHV were the smaller enclaves of “less civilized societies”, which held out much 
longer. These communities, formerly often termed primitive, proved to be much harder to 
subjugate, even in the long run. Ironically, these societies initially were neglected by 
historians who instead turned to their more “advanced” neighbors. Thus the successful 
resistance put up by these societies was often discarded. Only fairly recently has an interest 
developed in this indigenous resistance at all. 
Initially, the Indians were divided among the FRQTXLVWDGRUHV. This system was 
legalized in 1503 and developed into the more formal one of the HQFRPLHQGD, giving a 
contingent of Indians varying in size to individual Spaniards, who could be considered the 
second wave of Spanish civil servants.23 The HQFRPHQGHURV were entitled to the work force of 
these people but at the same time were obliged to educate them in the faith, among other 
things.24 Since they were not owned by the HQFRPHQGHURV, the Indians were still considered to 
be free (Gibson 1987:402). This system, described in the Laws of Burgos in 1512, was 
designed for the extraction of wealth from the continent.25 It was legally discontinued in 
1542. The loss in lives of that time was largely due to diseases, but not helped by the 
hardships suffered in the HQFRPLHQGD was considerable, if hard to quantify (see Wolf 
1982:133, see also Gibson 1987:403). 
As to the matter of land ownership, the Spanish Crown considered the (vacant) lands 
as already theirs, even prior to occupation, according to a papal charter (Gibson 1987:407, 
Pietschmann 1980b:59). In accordance with the doctrine of discovery, only the Crown could 
distribute lands, to individuals as well as to communities. It did, however, also to an extent 
accept indigenous ownership of lands, which it alone by right of discovery was entitled to 
                                                                
22
 Gibson sees this survival as crucial for the little opposition encountered. 
23
 On difficulties of definition with regard to the HQFRPLHQGD, see Pietschmann (1980b:82). 
24
 The Indians were considered minors and thus in need of education (see König, 1989:107). Underdevelopment 
or being uncivilized was and is constructed as an authoritative discourse by the invaders in those days as 
today in the field of development aid. 
In the most common form of the HQFRPLHQGD, the master, the HQFRPHQGHUR, was entitled to Indian labour in 
exchange for the duty of protection and instruction in the Christian doctrine (see Pietschmann 1992:579, see 
also Gibson 1964:58). 
The term UHSDUWLPLHQWR was often used synonymously (see Pietschmann 1980b:83). 
25
 The HQFRPLHQGD, which had its roots in the UHFRQTXLVWD existed until the middle of the 18th century. It was 
replaced in 1635 by the HQFRPLHQGDGH WULEXWRV, which authorised the HQFRPHQGHURV to the collection of 
tributes only (see Pieper and Luetjens 1994:580). 
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distinguish, usually by consent of the Indians in question (Pietschmann 1994:242). “But in 
practice this principle was not adhered to“, as historian Charles Gibson (1987:407) has 
correctly pointed out.26 The manners in which the Indians’ lands were usurped were multifold 
(Gibson 1987:408-11, see also Gibson 1964:274-76). “The land-granting authorities of the 
Spanish colonial government – FDELOGRV viceroys, and their agents – characteristically gave 
higher priority to Spanish interests than to Indian interests.” (Gibson 1987:388) Yet “because 
the subordinate inhabitants of ... lands were immune from early HQFRPLHQGD tribute, it lay 
within the interests of the early HQFRPHQGHURV to reject the claims of private Indian possession 
in the HQFRPLHQGD areas.“ (Gibson 1964:264) The Spaniards also tended to “simplify” other 
Indian landholdings that way, whenever they failed to understand the underlying system 
(Gibson 1964:264). They also resorted to falsification, threats, and other illegal practices 
(Gibson 1987:390). Those Indians who could afford legal steps often did so but the Spaniards 
were in the more favorable position in the long run. For the time being, the Spanish colonists 
were more preoccupied with labor than with land (Gibson 1987:408).27 They considered 
themselves obligated to bring the infidels over to Christianity, and conveniently were getting 
Indian labor and also Indian land in return.  
The Spaniards were very successful in obtaining both. “As mining flourished and more 
people moved to the mining areas, the demand for agricultural goods increased, as did the 
need for labor. Both led to a reduction of Indian lands.” (Cockcroft 1990:29) In 1542/43, the 
New Laws /H\HV1XHYDV among other things forbade the further allocation of Indian lands 
to colonists.28 They also abolished the inheritance of HQFRPLHQGDV and stipulated them to 
revert to the Crown upon the death of the HQFRPHQGHURBut great parts of these laws soon 
proved to be impossible to enforce by colonial officials and consequently were revoked as 
early as 1545. The benefits for the Indians, who were described as vassals of the Crown, were 
                                                                
The Laws of Burgos were a collection of all laws regarding Indians. They were the first laws exclusively passed 
for the New World (see Pieper and Luetjens 1994:579-581). 
26
 For instance, what could be called hunting territories were assumed to be vacant and ceased by the Spaniards. 
The same was the case with communal areas. 
27
 Gibson (1987) assumes the reason to be that land at that time was not available due to Indian landholdings. 
This only changed when the massive depopulation set in (see Gibson 1964:406). Also, initially the Spaniards felt 
more drawn to the urban areas of the New World. 
28
 The /H\HV1XHYDV also prohibited the new allocation of HQFRPLHQGDV. Existing ones were to be reduced to an 
“appropriate” size. The New Laws also (again) declared the Indians to be free vassals of the Crown who, 
due to their cultural inferiority, still needed protection and thus had a special status. The laws also did away 
with slavery for good; earlier on a few exceptions had applied.  
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extremely short-lived (see Pietschmann 1980a:71).29 Essentially, these laws represented the 
Spanish attitudes, which were to prevail for the entire colonial era. They viewed Indians as 
individuals instead of as members of indigenous communities, while at the same time 
contrasting themselves, the UHS~EOLFDGHHVSDxROHV with the Indians, the UHS~EOLFDGHLQGLRV
(Feest 2000:90, see also Pieper and Luetjens 1994:575f). These attitudes followed pre-
conquest Spanish precedents. “The idea that defeated peoples resided in their own parallel 
communities was culturally familiar to Spaniards.” (Seed 2001:83) 
But, as seen with the HQFRPLHQGD, the colonial economy also needed a workforce. 
Another means to exploit the Indians was the so-called UHSDUWLPLHQWR It was likewise a 
measure intended to counteract labor shortages. In one of its forms, Indian villages had to 
perform certain duties, usually labor duties.30 In this system, a certain quota of workers was 
assigned to the colonists and also to cities (see Pieper and Luetjens 1994:594). The official 
end of the UHSDUWLPLHQWR came about in 1632. In addition to the forms already mentioned 
there was free labor and various forms of debt labor existed. 
From the mid-sixteenth century on Indians were resettled in the so-called SXHEORV GH
LQGLRV In theory, this meant that the Indians were to govern themselves (Hoekstra 1993:81). 
“Protective segregation and a degree of political autonomy for communities did not mean that 
the Spanish rulers intended Indian life to carry on unchanged.” (Taylor 1979:17) Among other 
things, this step was supposed to facilitate the collection of tribute, one of the officials’ most 
important duties. These were usually collected by the FDFLTXHVwho thereby retained some of 
the pre-conquest influence.31 “The colonial tax system grafted onto native boundaries 
contributed to the survival of local nobles, granting them entailed estates and other colonial 
privileges in exchange for their responsibilities as collectors of the royal tribute and 
organizers of the labor drafts.” (Taylor 1979:18) However, this resettlement and the 
classification to go with it also defined the legal status of an Indian (Hoekstra 1993:231). 
Robert Jackson has explored this further and discovered that the classification often depended 
on the situation and the current needs of the Spanish colonizers (Jackson 1999). 
Another form of dealing with the indigenous peoples of Latin America was the 
                     
29
 Pietschmann (1980b:71-72) identifies the Crown’s efforts starting with the Laws of Burgos as attempts to 
create homogenous subjects. 
30
 In the most common form of the UHSDUWLPLHQWR, upon the granting of a petition, a quota of indigenous workers 
from the area were assigned to a colonist. The UHSDUWLPLHQWRGH WUDEDMRwas abolished in 1633. Later on, 
forms like the trade UHSDUWLPLHQWR developed. 
31
 This has been explored for instance by Gibson (1964:149). 
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mission.32 The missionaries, also at times serving as a type of substitute civil servant, were to 
introduce the Indians to Christianity and to the Spanish way of life. The SDGUHV, who took 
over duties of Spanish colonial officials regarding the Indians, were supposed to gradually 
familiarize their disciples with the Spanish society and its rules. “The concept of Indians as, 
ultimately, full citizens of the Spanish Empire was generally accepted as the basis of 
missionary work and had been a part of the working philosophy of those Spanish 
administrators who bothered with political thought.” (Spicer 1962:335)33 Yet many did not 
bother at all. Thus for a while, the Indians benefited from the protection of the missionaries as 
well as by being temporarily exempted from the payment of tributes. But it got increasingly 
hard to protect the Indians and their land. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
Crown offered the colonists to acquire legal titles to their land through payments. This 
method was called FRPSRVLFLyQ GH WLHUUDV and it effectively reduced Indian landholdings. 
Towards the end of the colonial era KDFLHQGDV surrounded many Indian communities. And 
even without the HQFRPLHQGD many Indians found themselves in a state of debt peonage due 
to small wages.  
In general, colonial Indian policy was to a large extent motivated through reasons 
other than mere humanitarian ones, as historian Horst Pietschmann has pointed out (see 
Pietschmann 1980b:92). Economic and political issues were at the heart of the matter, 
accounting for its central importance (see Pietschmann 1980b:93). Economic aspects were 
also the motivation behind many colonial administrators. After all, frequently the offices were 
sold and thus the officeholder had to think of ways to make his investment pay off. Also, the 
lower ranking offices examined here did not pay enough for what was considered an adequate 
lifestyle for a Spaniard and consequently had to be supplemented by other means.34 Civil 
servants often found ways to exploit their offices along with their Indian charges. Usually, 
                     
32
 For the colonial mission to the Indians see among others Becker (1983, see also Hausberger 2000).
33
 Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-1566) was a Spanish priest and missionary and also for a time bishop of 
Chiapas. He repeatedly attempted to better the Indians’ condition in the New World. 
Incidentally, the discussion of Las Casas and his attempts to improve the situation of the Indians in a good many 
books takes up more space than the description of the conditions the Indians lived in and how those came 
about. 
34
 These lower ranking offices were also the ones in charge of Indians, like the FRUUHJLGRU (see Pietschmann 
1980a:131). The FRUUHJLGRU had judicial and also certain legislative powers. The FRUUHJLPLHQWR was the 
principal unit of local administration (see Lang 1975). As Borah points out, no substantial changes came 
with the Bourbon reforms. Officials and their aides continued to be underpaid (see Borah 1983:149). 
Trough the Bourbon reforms (1786), the FRUUHJLGRU was replaced by the intendant, possibly to stop the well-
known abuses by limiting power. The FRUUHJLPLHQWRV were joined and so-called subdelegates created. They 
were in effect not long enough to make a difference. 
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that resulted in the exploitation of the Indians (see for instance Stern 1987:34). If need be, 
laws were disobeyed or bent to achieve that goal. It was these laws and the aforementioned 
economic aspects, which chiefly linked the worlds of Spanish officials and of Indians. And on 
occasion, the Indians resisted the ensuing measures, sometimes actively, and sometimes 
passively. Very often, this resistance took the form of legal suits (Borah 1983:40).35 
Resistance in the form of village uprising increased greatly in Mexico of the later colonial 
period (Taylor 1993:111).36 However, once the immediate goal of the uprisings had been 
achieved or at least promises extracted, the villagers’ violence usually stopped (Taylor 
1993:115). At other times, aggression simply burned itself out (Taylor 1993:115). Colonial 
state officials often negotiated to minimize their losses but were also unlikely to punish whole 
communities (Cockcroft 1990:117). This would have been counterproductive in the pursuit of 
their very own personal goals. They needed the indigenous labor force. Yet once pacification 
had been achieved, of course there was a lot less incentive to keep the promises made. Only if 
the negotiations failed, the officials resorted to brute force. “The Spanish response to 
community uprisings in central and southern Mexico, a calculated blend of punishment and 
mercy, generally followed the principle of ‘pacification without destroying the Indians’.” 
(Cockcroft 1990:116) And on the whole, “the colonial regime governed the countryside 
largely by not governing.“ (Taylor 1979:165) As long as no major disturbances occurred, 
things were pretty much left alone.  
“As population pressure and colonial demands increased, state officials were 
increasingly perceived as excessive and abusive. Angered by what was seen as growing 
Indian resistance, some colonial representatives resorted to even more threats and force than 
normal to conduct their business. The spontaneous nature of the tumults suggests that the 
Indians were provoked to action rather than having planned their violence.” (Stavig 
1996:228) Newer historical research emphasizes the aforementioned spontaneity as well as a 
greater variety of reasons for uprisings, and a greater breadth of responses than has 
traditionally been assumed. For instance, rebellions often ensued when individuals of power 
were removed from these positions. Indians also rose up when they considered the tribute and 
labor demands as too great a strain on them. But responses were multifold. Instead of taking 
up arms, indigenous communities also resorted to flight or simply refused to obey (see among 
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athors Jones 1989). This WLELH]D, or passive resistance, also came in the form of secrecy and 
cold treatment. And it is specifically the secrecy, which makes it so hard to get to colonial 
native motives today. An interesting case is one of continued resistance in an Andean town. 
There, the natives stubbornly refused to pay tribute. “They considered tribute nonpayment a 
way of defending what they thought to be an immemorial and correct standard of intergroup 
relations.“ (Salomon 1987:162) The author, Frank Salomon, concludes that the Indians did 
not perceive themselves as part of the Spanish community and thus not as subject to the same 
laws. Historian William B. Taylor concurs in general, stating that “village uprisings expressed 
a defiant isolationism in reaction to change imposed from outside.” (Taylor 1979:153) 
For Mexico, Taylor emphasizes the spontaneity of armed outbursts and how short-
lived they usually were. Also, he concludes that they were nearly all by members of a single 
community in reaction to outside threats (Taylor 1979:115). In the cases he looked at he 
found little evidence of planned leadership. Mostly, the uprisings burned themselves out after 
a few days. Yet he comes to the conclusion that no uniform pattern existed. “There are too 
many revolts that do not seem to follow on a period of worsening material conditions and too 
many rural societies living through increasing poverty without showing an increase in social 
violence to hazard any universal statements about economic deprivation, elite intransigence, 
and peasant unrest.” (Taylor 1979:131) Taylor believes that it was elite willingness to 
compromise, which avoided some rebellions. However, as the one common factor in most of 
the uprisings, in spite of regional variation, he identifies the fact that the rebellions often set 
off by what seemed like minor changes. “Peasant villages were reacting to what they 
considered an immediate threat to their way of life.” (Taylor 1979:142) These were, for 
instance, rejection of new taxes – instead of taxes as such, land disputes, labor issues, 
questions of liberty and autonomy, or political reasons. 
Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, examining eighteenth-century Peru, somewhat seconds this 
with the finding of numerous cases of PLWD\RV leaving work before the end of their turn, 
complaining of bad treatment (O’Phelan Godoy 1985:40).37 But she also points to other 
matters. “Fiscal issues constantly lay at the root of colonial social unrest.” (O’Phelan Godoy 
1985:49) Yet, just like Taylor, she concludes that people did not object to taxes as such but 
only did rebel under certain circumstances. For instance, the legalization of the UHSDUWR only 
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caused unrest in areas already affected by GLH]PR and/or PLWD(O’Phelan Godoy 1985:119).38 
The situation was probably often aggravated because the tributes were commonly collected 
all at the same time. Like other authors, she also mentions rivalries for the post of FDFLTXH as 
a possible reason for uprisings and unrest (O’Phelan Godoy 1985:133). Similarly, Susan M. 
Deeds points out – for the mission societies – that it was often individuals removed from 
positions of power who initiated rebellions (Deeds 1998:25). Ronald Spores, on the other 
hand, ascertains that “Indians were far more likely to quarrel among themselves over 
boundaries, FDFLFD]JRV resources, or a subject community’s desire to break away from the 
control of its FDEHFHUD (head town) than they were to openly or violently resist Spanish 
domination.“ (Spores 1998:33)39 When uprisings against the Spaniards occurred, they were 
most often motivated by heavy demands for native labor and other abuses - mostly 
administrative, commercial, and social ones. Yet the success of these uprisings in general can 
at best be described as mixed. “In the short run, villagers could count many successes – tax 
payments were reduced or suspended, offensive civil servants were reprimanded or removed, 
and corrupt labor practices were reformed.“ (Taylor 1979:169) But there was little general 
improvement. The lessons learned by the officials were hardly ever applied in other cases – 
unless there, too, disruptions occurred. As William Taylor ascertains, “Spanish absolutism 
was less authoritarian and above all, less efficient that is often supposed“, because authorities 
treated isolated problems and did not see one grievance leading to rebellion as a reason to 
check elsewhere for that problem (Taylor 1979:168). The authorities were primarily 
concerned with control - and particularly with smooth tax-collection – and not with general 
improvements for the native population. Resistance did not always take the form of violence. 
Roland Spores examines a case in which the FDFLTXH led the entire town into hiding in the 
mountains (Spores 1998:37). Such cases were less spectacular than rebellions and therefore 
probably less likely to bring about permanent changes. 
 Nancy Farriss is one of several more recent authors to emphasize how multifold 
indigenous responses to Spanish attempts at colonization were. “Simple acceptance and 
rejection of alien cultural elements are only two among many possible responses, and much 
more common may be the transformation of old forms into something that never existed in 
either of the original cultures.“ (Farriss 1983:2) Farriss also scrutinizes the Bourbon reforms 
of the late eighteenth century. “Before the introduction of the intendancy system in 1786, each 
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Indian community dealt directly with the provincial administration.“ (Farriss 1983:12) This 
way, local Indian leaders were left largely alone. That is, as long as they managed “to deliver 
the goods and services the Spanish demanded and to keep order within their communities 
under the more or less watchful eye of the parish priest.“ (Farriss 1983:13) This often 
amounted to a de facto autonomy of Indian communities. To a large extent, one “could say in 
general that the Indians and vecinos inhabited separate social worlds.“ (Farriss 1983:19) 
 Yet these worlds were not unconnected. As seen, the Spaniards’ arrival and attempts 
at Hispanicization were not at all without impact. Robert Wasserstrom points specifically at 
civil servants in that respect. “Unlike religious corporations, provincial governors set out to 
organize a network of commercial enterprises based not on direct ownership of land but on 
the extensive exploitation of native labor.“ (Wasserstrom 1983:96) And these officials often 
pursued their own enrichment single-mindedly. So single-mindedly in fact, that even the 
Spanish YHFLQRV protested because they felt unfairly treated in the face of so many monopolies 
(see Wasserstrom 1983:98). William L. Sherman takes his criticism of the officials involved a 
step further. “CRUUHJLGRUHVand DOFDOGHVPD\RUHV, often lacking any respectable preparation 
for such positions, physically mistreated the natives and cheated them as well.“ (Sherman 
1983:180) He considers the ones coming after the Bourbon reforms to have been just as 
greedy as their predecessors. John H. Coatsworth seconds this opinion: “In Peru, nearly all of 
the village uprisings of the 1760s and 1770s were provoked by the predatory behavior of 
FRUUHJLGRUHV, who collected the tribute, enforced new crown monopolies, and imposed the 
UHSDUWLPLHQWRGHPHUFDQFtDV“(Coatsworth 1988:49) Yet he agrees with other historians that 
there is no such thing as an overall Spanish American pattern to be found. “Protests against 
new taxes, or abuses by tax collectors, were important in nearly half of the Mexican village 
uprisings, but other provocations played a more significant role than in Peru.“ (Coatsworth 
1988:49) 
Steve J. Stern analyses the officials’ behavior further. “Eager to make a small fortune 
during his term of several years, a newly arriving FRUUHJLGRU often cultivated working 
relationships with regional elites whose interest, in administration, commerce, manufacturing, 
mining, and agriculture.” (Stern 1982:93) He supplies the example of Don Juan Manuel de 
Anaya, a FRUUHJLGRU in colonial Peru. Anaya was a career bureaucrat and had considerable 
means before he even took the post of FRUUHJLGRU in 1578. He saw this position as a means to 
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quickly increase his wealth, by commandeering labor, seizing money and goods, controlling 
and expanding trade circuits, and by backing ambitious commercial ventures (Stern 1982:97). 
“The FRUUHJLGRU passed out free or cheap labor to his friends, and demanded that expert 
native weavers supply him valuable luxury textiles at substandard prices.” (Stern 1982:97) He 
also forced the local Indians to sell valuable alpacas to his friends, again at substandard 
prices. These were then resold at high-price markets elsewhere, enriching Anaya and his 
partners. Anaya crated a scandal by using the local UHSDUWLPLHQWR’s money for one of his 
business enterprises, without consulting the priests first. So Anaya bought much “needed” 
ornaments cheaply in Lima and then resold them at hugely inflated prices (Stern 1982:97). 
Apparently, Anaya frequently used the FDMDVGHFRPXQLGDG community monies, for money or 
capital. He also violated legal ordinances through his entire behavior. “Anaya left behind a 
trail of notoriety and complicated litigation typical of authorities whose greed overreached 
their effective power, but his actions belonged to the mainstream of the colonials’ 
prerogatives and abuses.” (Stern 1982:97) For instance, the abuse of the FDMDVGHFRPXQLGDG 
was a quite ordinary issue. And the aforementioned abuses worked even better and were 
harder to detect if the FRUUHJLGRU worked together with the local elites. Another such example 
is introduced by Robert Patch, who describes the case of a Yucatecan governor, who 
controlled much of the local trade and production.40 Another governor changed the weights 
and increased the sheer quantities of goods contracted (see Patch 1993:88). However, the 
officials had to be careful not to cross too many lines. Stern tells of one case in 
Huamanga/Peru, where one magistrate angered too many nobles and ended up being charged 
with treason. He was beheaded and his severed head on a stake was displayed as a reminder 
and a warning to others (Patch 1993:88). 
Friedrich Katz points out that Indian resistance to these and other abuses may have been 
weakened by mortality. It also seems to have been a question of whom to blame for 
wrongdoings and misery. “Most rebellions were directed at local officials, and the Indians 
mostly remained firmly convinced that the crown, if it only knew, would redress their 
wrongs.” (Katz 1988:79) And in a way, this was not all that far off the truth since at least in 
theory and with some mostly unheeded laws the Crown did attempt to protect the Indians, 
probably for multiple, not entirely selfless reasons. For instance, it was against the law for the 
officials to pursue commerce – something hardly heeded. “The FRUUHJLGRUHV though 
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forbidden to engage in commercial activities, were the promoters and main agents of 
economic distribution among Indians.” (Gibson 1987:395) As seen, they abused their offices 
and positions of power to enrich themselves. Sometimes the law was broken clandestinely, at 
other times quite openly, sometimes alone, and at other times with private partners. Indians 
were thus compelled to buy to exorbitant prices, and sometimes even goods of little or no use 
to them. 
Rarely did complaints reach the right places or were they taken seriously enough. In 
1543, an HQFRPHQGHUR complained to the viceroy of New Spain that the governor and nobles 
of his town levy too much tribute and force the peasants to cultivate extra land. In response, 
the viceroy commissions an Indian as judge to investigate the matter and to send the ones he 
finds guilty of misconduct to come before the viceroy himself (Borah 1983:72). Yet often it 
was probably a common occurrence for the Indians to stand up for their rights themselves in 
court, just like they did when rebelling against abuses. Actually, “much of the energy that the 
colonials expended to drive the natives to comply with the hated labor drafts involved drawn-
out legal battles.“ (Stern 1982:117) The fact that Indians took some of their issues to court at 
all also testifies to their basic acceptance of the colonial system as such. “The colonial 
bureaucracy was impressively large for its day and peasants generally acknowledged its 
legitimacy by flooding the high courts with petitions and complaints, protesting abuse of 
power rather than questioning the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty.” (Taylor 1979:165) 
Therefore, while Indians might bitterly oppose the local officials, the Crown’s 
representatives, they did accept it as a legal sovereign (Taylor 1979:170). And if only this 
remote institution knew about their trouble and the abuses committed against them it would 
surely do something about it. The evidence for this trust can be found in the flood to the 
courts. 
But the knowledge of how to make use of the courts had to be acquired first. In the 
1580s, officials had to acknowledge that the efforts to introduce the Indians to the Spanish 
legal procedures had failed. “The Indians still lacked access to relatively simple, inexpensive, 
quick, and effective legal remedies.“ (Borah 1983:79) Consequently, the General Indian 
Court was established and special Indian agents “of the half-real” created. In Peru, networks 
of judges were established specifically to deal with native cases. They were free or available 
for a minimal charge. Yet even this legal system created and supposed to aid the Indians was 
abused by Spanish officials. For instance, Indians were told that wills had to be made before 
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the officials, who after the death of the person in question still proceeded to ignore the will 
and to enrich themselves with the inheritance (Borah 1983:86-87). Often, the ensuing court 
orders were defied for a very long time. But Indians were spared costs arising through having 
to contract the services of interpreters, solicitors, etc. The system’s costs were covered by tax 
money. A half-real per tributary of the annual community contribution was appropriated to 
cover the costs of the legal system (see Borah 1983:104). 
 In general, one can say that a “moderate amount of extortion does not seem to have 
brought the Indians to complaint; but when the fleecing reached proportions they deemed 
intolerable, they would protest either to the viceroy or the audiencia.“ (Borah 1983:150) So 
they essentially displayed a similar behavior as in the rebellions and uprisings but instead of 
resorting to violence or flight took their grievances to court. Woodrow Borah has examined 
such cases brought to the General Indian Court by Indians. Most of them were fairly ordinary 
ones, complaining of abuses, of being forced to pay too much tribute, etc.41 These cases were 
investigated in a variety of ways, and sometimes the officials accused were ordered to return 
the money they had unjustly extracted from the Indians and were admonished to do their duty 
properly.  
One of the most interesting cases sketched by Borah is actually one in which the 
Indians took the matter in their own hands – though neither by instigating an uprising nor by 
going to court. Some Indians in Cuzco killed a particularly abusive tax collector, who had 
previously beaten and jailed the FDFLTXH. But before resorting to this drastic and probably 
desperate measure, they had attempted to ask a local priest for help. Unfortunately, he himself 
had been afraid of this FREUDGRU, this tax collector. However, after the killing this priest 
proceeded to testify in favor of the Indians and no action was taken against them. “By going 
beyond the bounds that governed colonial relations, the tax collector had lost legitimate 
authority; hence, neither the Indians nor the Europeans viewed the killing as a challenge to or 
protest against colonial authority as a system.” (Stavig 1996:228) Like the tax collector, most 
officials had to negotiate a fine line between coercion and persuasion, had to figure out how 
much abuse and exploitation the Indians were disposed to accept. Should they overdo it in 
their personal quest for wealth, the outcome could be potentially disastrous. The ones who 
came to be sued were thus the ones who got off lightly in comparison to the fate of the 
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FREUDGRU. 
As Borah has found out through his analysis, “complaints against Spanish provincial 
governors, their subordinates, and other Spanish officials … constituted an appreciable 
proportion of the total business that came before the General Indian Court.“ (Borah 1983:148-
49) This is not at all surprising after the glimpses of the attitudes and behavior displayed by 
colonial officials with regard to the Indian populace, which have been briefly examined in the 
examples above. 
 
As seen, it was in the officials’ own interest to keep the Indians alive and able to 
work. Therefore, the number of responses available to them was rather restricted. While the 
Indians were clearly not in a position of power, they were not doomed to accept any 
treatment, either. 
Quite obviously, during the whole of the colonial period, many indigenous identity 
traits and traditions were retained. That is not to say that all kept their pre-contact identities. 
On the contrary, identities changed and even so-called ODGLQR Indians, Spanish speaking and 
acculturated Indians, came into being as also becomes apparent through colonial censuses. In 
the newer sociological literature on globalization this can be interpreted as hybridization or 
cultural mélange (Nederveen Pieterse 1994:161-184). 
 
While much remains in the dark about the relationship between the Spanish colonial 
official and the Indians of the New World, what can be said is that the officials were not 
entirely successful in their role as experts bringing the Spanish system to the New World. 
Horst Pietschmann concludes that the efforts helped to integrate the Indians culturally, 
socially, economically, and with regards to religion – but that they at the same time stood in 
the way of complete adaptation (Pietschmann 1980b:137). As seen in connection with the 
tribute collection, the old system was much too convenient and worked too well to be 
sacrificed by the officials. So the Indians could afford to keep a number of older structures. 
Rik Hoekstra confirms this by pointing out that “although the Spaniards did of course impose 
their rule, initially they did not try to introduce profound changes into the existing society.“ 
(Hoekstra 1993:49) Parts of the pre-colonial system suited them just fine. 
The Indians insisted on being selective in their acceptance of proceedings, knowledge 
  18
and other, more practical introductions. For instance, they seem to eagerly have embraced the 
potter’s wheel, oxen and plow yet resisted other introductions (see Taylor 1979:22-23, see 
also Patch 1993:27). They also to a large extent embraced or rather, instrumentalized the 
Spanish legal system to settle both their grievances with Spaniards and internal affairs (see 
Lockhardt 1968:237, see also Borah 1983). They insisted on that local knowledge, which 
seemed most valuable to them but the motives for their decisions and behavior are hard to get 
at because indigenous sources are lacking.42 And since the Spanish officials often 
misunderstood the Indians and the latter did generally not deem it necessary to explain 
themselves to them, the Spanish sources are of little help in that respect. Explications may 
have been lost through a variety of filters, mostly through the officials themselves or their 
higher-ups. Also, officials found multiple ways to limit the interactions and dealings with the 
indigenous peoples by hiring other Indians to perform certain tasks in their stead. The latter 
Indians had often held similar posts pre-conquest and the Spaniards made use of these older 
systems present in the “high-cultures” like the Maya, Aztecs/Mexica, and Inca – with the 
blessing of the officials in charge. 
These officials frequently had a lot of freedom, at least as long as they performed their 
key functions fairly well, like the collection of tribute. And if there were not too many 
complaints about them, individual officials could in many respects do as they pleased. 
Usually only if problems mounted were vLVLWDFLRQHV held, were other administrators sent to 
check on their colleagues, in a way not unlike a modern-day evaluation mission. But since 
this generally happened only after troubles had already occurred, it was often too late to get 
immediate reactions. In addition, even complaints and reports on officials abusing their rank 
took a lot of time, due to the underdeveloped infrastructure and the long distances involved.  
It was unlikely for the officials, even the higher-ups, to search for the mistake amongst 
themselves. That is not to say that gross abuse was left unpunished when discovered. But it 
was deemed unlikely – if not impossible – that the Indians could know something, could 
possibly contribute something to the Spanish way of life. “For Spaniards, Indians of whatever 
class were people with a lower, never higher, status.“ (Patch 1993:24) Their input, in legal 
cases as in general, was not taken seriously and thus often probably left out in the reports. So 
this knowledge, which could have greatly facilitated matters for the officials by making them 
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understand the problems they faced, usually did not make the transition to information, did 
not get to the key figures who could have used it. If it was reported at all, it probably was not 
passed on high enough or not processed by the intended recipients. Therefore, the lower ranks 
of officials received mostly standardized instructions, completely leaving aside regional 
variants and needs. 
One well-documented exception is the viceroy Toledo of Peru. To set up the PLWD and 
other systems, “Toledo spent five years (1570-1575) traveling throughout the Andean 
highlands on an audacious YLVLWDor tour of inspection, designed to implement an effective, 
direct reorganization once and for all.“ (Stern 1982:76) He thus specifically attempted to 
collect and use first-hand knowledge. And since tribute was traditionally paid in labor 
therefore the system was left that way. But even though – or maybe because - Toledo tackled 
his assigned task somewhat more systematically than others, he was still motivated by the 
same things as most of his colleagues. Extraction of wealth was of prime importance to him 
as well. “The irony of Toledo’s extractive regime was that it imposed terrible burdens which 
ultimately menaced local economies and life rhythms, but did not immediately eliminate the 
natives’ subsistence capacity or economic independence.“ (Stern 1982:92) In that respect, as 
well as in others, hispanicization had failed. 
Globalizing or better, Hispanicizing the indigenous system was far from being an easy 
task for the officials anyway. For instance, according to the Aztec tradition, all tributes were 
in kind and when the Spaniards insisted on conversion into money the system fell apart 
(Hoekstra 1993:66). So the authorities decided to compromise and the Indians were told only 
to supply goods originating in their own SXHEOR however, a common tribute item had been 
mantles, made of cotton imported from other areas, and the Indians took the new rule as an 
excuse not to pay with mantles anymore. Thus there were far more problems encountered 
than could have been anticipated in Spain. Things might have worked better had the civil 
servants taken the Indians and their customs more seriously and had inquired more into the 
nature of the old system, like Toledo had done. A horizontal exchange between the officials 
of a particular Indian group also might have helped. But there was no functioning network 
between individual officials, partly due to the difficulties with communication. However, as 
Jochen Meissner has shown for the FDELOGR of Mexico City, it was possible to set up 
functioning networks – when the officials’ private business interests were concerned (see 
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Meissner 1993). “In a society where access to influence constituted the lifeline of wealth and 
enterprise, high lords and petty tyrants alike spun complicated webs of kinship and placement 
which enhanced their political reach and stature. In the countryside, FRUUHJLGRUHV and other 
Spanish lords were not too proud to become godparents of Indian children. Local colonials 
even married the daughters of NXUDNDV who had their own reasons for such alliances.” (Stern 
1982:101) If needed to further their own interests, the officials were perfectly capable of not 
only establishing functioning networks among themselves, but also to interface with the local 
Indian population. After all, they were serious about their personal projects, about money 
acquisition. And “in the final analysis“, as Steve Stern has correctly determined, “the energy 
and wealth devoted to solidifying or extending points of loyalty and cooperation in various 
elite networks could make the difference between success and failure.“ (Stern 1982:101) And 
a few FRUUHJLGRUHV actually did manage to get rich in a short time (Gudmundson 1996:159). 
Steve Stern also states that “it was precisely because Indians did not succumb easily to 
coercive pressure, and even escaped beyond certain limits, that colonials come to rely also on 
a second adaptation: the use of voluntary agreements, contracts, and early forms of wage 
labor to secure native services.“ (Stern 1982:156) After all, the officials needed them to co-
operate since they could not rule by coercion alone. More likely, they did rely on force only 
when quelling uprisings and may even have preferred appeasement to force. 
Charles Gibson comes to a similar conclusion on the double function of some Spanish 
introductions and the power structures involved. “Tribute became one of the principal devices 
of control exercised by HQFRPHQGHURV over Indians, and their tribute collectors, themselves 
commonly Indians, were among the most feared of the encomenderos’ agents.“ (Gibson 
1987:379) Tribute and labor, two elements central to the duties of many colonial officials, 
were ways to enrich the administrators and also mechanisms of control and to propagate the 
Spanish way of life. According to Gibson, in this the FRUUHJLGRUHV were often worse than 
HQFRPHQGHURV (Gibson 1987:381) Yet this control could have been exercised more 
effectively had the officials managed to integrate and transmit local knowledge.
For a long time Indians were considered to be a more or less uniform group, childlike 
savages, instead of different peoples with different ways of life, traditions, customs. And a lot 
of the officials probably cared less about their duties than about their personal enrichment. 
Most tried to avoid staying in their assigned area and instead opted to live in one of the 
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PHWUySROLV of the New World. So their work was usually left to some Indian hirelings, who 
carried out the tasks and reported to their master. These Indians naturally mostly kept doing 
what they or their ancestors had been doing pre-conquest. 
 
Therefore, it becomes quite plain that Spanish civil servants lacked a number of 
qualifications and even virtues to be development experts in the current sense of the word. 
For instance, they were not required to learn indigenous languages, like many of the 
missionaries sent to Indian communities. While they were supposed to propagate the Spanish 
system and way of life in the New World and especially when it came to the Indians, they 
were not given the training this task would have required. For instance, instructions for 
DOFDOGHVPD\RUHV evolved during the 16th century and included many clauses emphasize good 
behavior. They were to collect only tribute and no other contributions, should see to it that 
Indians were not forced to sell below proper prices, were not supposed to accept gifts or to 
engage in trade, to keep livestock, or to have HVWDQFLDV or land (see Borah 1983:149-50). 
Also, and especially since the sale of offices was not uncommon, too little effort was 
put into selecting individuals qualified and disposed to perform the duties in question.43 For 
many officials, the job they took was supposed to be a temporary one, a step on their way to 
riches. They intended to make a fortune in the New World, to then return to Spain. They were 
not professional enough, in the current sense of the word. This becomes apparent in use of the 
pre-Spanish systems to collect tribute, and by the hiring of Indians helpers so that the officials 
themselves could spend their time in the bigger cities. While they were present, in the sense 
of being in the New World, the officials were also absent, because they did not stay in their 
sphere of duty. They probably lacked all but the most basic understanding of that sphere – or 
maybe chose to use what knowledge they had for their private business enterprises instead of 
for their assigned duties. 
It was hard to check on the lower ranks of administrators effectively, due to the 
communicational problems already mentioned. This also aggravated the flow of information. 
Not only was it very slow, but there were very many filters enroute because of the chain of 
command imposed. Knowledge was lost along the way because it was deemed unnecessary, 
not taken seriously, or simply not understood. And there was no network of officials 
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dedicated to the exchange of knowledge and information – at least not when it came to 
performing the tasks of their offices. 
Therefore, one could say that it was matters, which are still crucial for experts today, 
which kept Spanish colonial officials from being true development experts. It was the transfer 
of data, the command structures, professionalization, networks, and knowledge filters, which 
made it hard for them to effectively perform their tasks. For instance, the lessons learned in 
one uprising were hardly ever applied to other cases because of the lack of data transfer. And 
while the officials often were very professional when it came to benefit their own enrichment, 
they hardly ever displayed the same level of professionalization when it came to the duties of 
their office. The rigidity of the command structure and the long distances involved were 
hampering their performance even more. All of this was aggravated by the generally poor 
selection and training of the officials, as well as by their absence from their spheres of duty 
and by their private agendas. Some of them pursued the latter with too much success to call 
them inept, to come back to the introductory question. So Spanish civil servants were 
supposed to be experts but fell short of meeting that goal, partly because they were 
individuals out for personal profit, partly because of the problems inherent in the New World 
situation. 
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